18th November 2005

Afghanistan Insurgency

by Erich Marquardt -- Source: www.pinr.com

The Afghan insurgency continues to burden U.S., N.A.T.O. and Afghan troops. The Afghan government and the powers that support it have been unable to eliminate the resurgent Taliban and Islamist insurgency that finds its support in the countryside. The insurgents are using methods of guerrilla warfare to target policemen, international workers, and U.S., N.A.T.O. and Afghan troops. The insurgents regularly set up ambushes and then retreat near the end of the ensuing firefight before military reinforcements can be called in. Additionally, insurgents are increasingly using suicide attacks and remote-detonated roadside bombs, apparently learning from the guerrilla tactics used by insurgents in Iraq.

While the United States and its allies in the 2001 Afghan intervention have had notable successes -- most significantly, the removal of the Taliban regime from power and the creation of a new democratic government complete with elections -- they have been unable to stomp out the ongoing insurgency that continues to shake Afghanistan's stability. In addition, they have failed to control the power of the warlords that run different regions of the country. The most significant reason behind these failures is the lack of military support and economic assistance provided to the Afghan government in Kabul.

The Insurgency

In the first 11 months of 2005, 87 U.S. troops have been killed in action, a number that makes up almost half of the 186 killed since the 2001 intervention began. In the years since the invasion, the insurgents' tactics have improved, and they are more successful at causing casualties to government and international troops. This was most recently visible on September 25, 2005 when insurgents shot down a U.S. Chinook helicopter in Zabul province, killing five American soldiers. U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Donald Bolduc, whose unit is serving its fourth tour in Afghanistan, commented on the increasing effectiveness of the insurgents, arguing, "The [troops] would tell you that this is a different enemy than they saw before."

Much of the country has stabilized, but the peace remains fragile, and attacks by guerrillas can occur at any time. For instance, when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited the country on October 12, 2005, insurgents fired three rockets in downtown Kabul. Afghan policemen seem to be bearing the brunt of the insurgent attacks, and are regularly targeted by Taliban and Islamist fighters. In one instance, also on October 12, 18 policemen were killed in Helmand province. More than 200 police have been killed in 2005.

Only eight days after the Helmand attack, a car bomb detonated near a mosque in the south of the country, killing Nafus Khan, the deputy provincial police chief of Nimroz province. Highlighting the dangers to aid workers, that same day on October 20 an aid worker was killed after being shot by gunmen on motorbikes. Suicide attacks have also been on the rise, with at least 16 incidents in 2005, more than any year since the intervention began and more than double the suicide attack total of 2004; it appears that insurgents are copying tactics used in Iraq.

The latest suicide attacks occurred on November 14 and November 16. In the November 14 incidents, two separate militants rammed car bombs into the vehicles of N.A.T.O. troops in Kabul; the attacks killed a German soldier and a handful of Afghan civilians. In the November 16 incident, a suicide militant rammed an explosive-laden taxi into an American military convoy in Kandahar, killing two Afghan civilians.

Opium and the Warlords

Afghanistan's thriving drug trade is also responsible for much of the country's violence. Fifty percent of the country's G.D.P. comes directly or indirectly from the drug trade, primarily in opium production. The different drug cartels that are involved in production and transportation contribute to the country's violent crime.

The drug trade is made possible by the country's local warlords. The central government in Kabul has been unable to exercise control over the different power factions that control certain parts of the country. While the warlords are not a united grouping, they make it difficult for the central government to extend its authority into all provinces. The warlords themselves do not want to give up power to the central government. Some of these warlords participated in Afghanistan's recent parliamentary elections and many were elected.

The United States and its allies used the warlords and their respective armies to help stabilize Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. Now, the warlords have entrenched their power and, without a significant increase in U.S. or N.A.T.O. troops, cannot be removed from their positions. This makes it impossible for Kabul to gain complete control of the country, meaning that there is little it can do to stop the flourishing drug trade on its own. More troubling, the different centers of power also make it easier for Taliban and Islamist insurgents to move throughout the country and attack international and government troops.

Mild Tension Between Kabul and Washington

Tension remains between Kabul and Washington. The United States military is working to preserve the fragile sense of stability in the country, without actually having to increase the number of U.S. troops on the ground. In its efforts to preserve stability, it often undertakes actions that alienate the Afghan population. The Pentagon's use of air strikes frequently results in civilian casualties, and the U.S. military's practice of searching Afghan homes is extremely unpopular among the country's population.

These practices concern the government of President Hamid Karzai, who wants to ensure that U.S. actions do not buoy the support of the insurgency. In May 2005, for example, Karzai tried to gain more control over military operations in Afghanistan; the United States, however, rejected his request.

Additionally, in September 2005, Karzai tried to establish a policy where the U.S. military had to secure Kabul's approval before executing air strikes and searching homes. The United States again rejected the requests, arguing that a change in policy would hamper its ability to fight the insurgency. There is little that Karzai can do in the face of such rejections since his power is founded upon the support of U.S. and N.A.T.O. troops.

Other U.S. actions have spurred political protests in the country. For instance, earlier in 2005, in response to a report that U.S. operatives at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp had flushed a copy of the Quran down a toilet as part of their interrogation procedures, protests erupted. The May 2005 protests spread to more than ten provinces in Afghanistan, resulting in deaths and injuries as Afghan security forces attempted to quell the riots and demonstrations.

With the October 19, 2005 release of a new video showing U.S. soldiers desecrating the corpses of Taliban fighters, there was fear that protests would erupt once again; major demonstrations, however, have yet to occur. The video, believed to have been shot October 1, 2005 in Gonbaz, in the southern province of Kandahar, was filmed by an Australian media network.

Karzai commented on the desecration incident, saying, "We in Afghanistan, in accordance with our religion and traditions and adherence to international law, are very unhappy and condemn the burning of two Taliban dead bodies." U.S. State Department Scott McCormack also commented on the video, telling reporters on October 20, "These are very serious allegations and, if true, very troublesome." Both the U.S. and Afghan governments have investigated the incidents, but the results of those investigations remain confidential. Indeed, once the results are made public, there is the possibility that it could spark more protests.

The Afghan-Pakistan Border

Karzai continues to express his frustration over the porous Afghan-Pakistan border. Insurgents regularly launch attacks on government targets in Afghanistan, and then escape across the border into Pakistan; there the insurgents often receive protection from the Pashtun tribes in Pakistan's lawless North-West Frontier Province. The Pak-Afghan border is 2400 kilometers (1500 miles) long and is mountainous and rugged, making it extremely difficult to guard or search. It is believed that al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and other senior al-Qaeda figures are hiding in this area. Many of the Pashtun tribes that live in the region do not recognize the border separating Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The United States has been pressuring Pakistan to better patrol the province, but this has proved difficult for Musharraf who faces his own internal legitimacy problems. He has been victim of multiple assassination attempts, and cracking down on the tribes that are situated along the Pak-Afghan border could further erode his legitimacy. Additionally, patrolling the border is difficult simply due to natural geography and the area's traditional autonomy. Hundreds of Pakistani security agents have died while conducting raids on Islamists in this region.

Restructuring of International Troops

Presently, 18,000 U.S. troops are involved in maintaining security and stability in Afghanistan. Additionally, 12,000 members of N.A.T.O. comprise the International Security Assistance Force (I.S.A.F.) and provide security in the north and west of the country, including the capital Kabul.

According to U.S. Marine General James Jones, N.A.T.O.'s supreme allied commander for operations, the N.A.T.O. mission will soon be expanded to the southern provinces, and, in the future, to the entire country. The exact date of when N.A.T.O. will be expanded into southern Afghanistan is still being debated.

The plan calls for German control of the northern provinces, Italian control of the western provinces and the area near Kabul, British troops in the south, the U.S. in the east, and French and Turkish troops also in the north.

The United States hopes that with the expansion of N.A.T.O. to all of Afghanistan it will be able to reduce the burden that the Afghan stability operation is causing to the U.S. military. The American military, currently engaged in stability operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, is hoping that its allies in these conflicts can commit more troops and lessen the burden on the United States.

However, a reduction in U.S. forces could embolden the insurgency. In the words of retired U.S. General Barry McCaffrey, who visited Afghanistan in August, "N.A.T.O. forces are in most cases going to be thin gruel compared to the U.S. [soldiers] they will replace."

Conclusion

The Afghan government's failure to end the insurgency, to gain more control over the warlords, and to suppress the lucrative drug trade can be explained by the unwillingness of the United States and N.A.T.O. to provide the necessary amount of troops and economic assistance to better stabilize the country. It is necessary for Kabul to gain more control over the warlords in order to have significant results in suppressing the drug trade and to make it more difficult for the Taliban and Islamist insurgency to operate.

Afghanistan remains a side project to Iraq, and the United States is interested in using as few resources as necessary to keep Afghanistan relatively stable. As long as the Afghan insurgency and the power of the warlords do not cause greater instability, the Afghan operation will remain on the backburner unless Iraq stabilizes. However, as long as present conditions continue in Afghanistan, the insurgency will not be defeated and the insurgents will continue to exploit weak points caused by the country's fragmented centers of power.